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War between Paraguay and Bolivia broke out in June 1932.1
Because both belligerents depended on outside military assistance,
American armament manufacturers found the situation attractive, par-
ticularly in view of the depressed economy at home. But national anti-
war sentiment, revulsion at the slaughter in the Gran Chaco, and the
urgings of Great Britain and the League of Nations prompted the
American government to terminate the developing arms trade. On
May 24, 1934, six days after it had been introduced, Congress approved
a Joint Resolution providing that "if the President finds that the pro-
hibition of the sale of arms and munitions of war in the United States
to those countries engaged in conflict in the Chaco may contribute to
the establishment of peace between those countries," he might pro-
claim an embargo on American arms shipments to the belligerents.
Violators would be fined, imprisoned, or both.2 Franklin D. Roosevelt
* Associate Professor of History, Claremont Men's College. A.B. 1961; M.A. 1962;
Ph.D. 1966, Stanford University. The author is indebted to Professor Ward E. Y. Elliott
for comments on an earlier draft.
1. For general historical background, see Divine, The Case of the Smuggled Bombers,
in QUARRELs THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONsrITUTION 210-21 (J. Garraty ed. 1966), on which I
have relied for otherwise undocumented details in this and the following paragraph. For
early analyses of Curtiss-Wright, see Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis
of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE LJ. 467 (1946); Patterson, In re The United
States v. The Curtiss-Wright Corporation (pts. 1-2), 22 TEXAs L. REv. 286, 445 (1944);
Quarles, The Federal Government: As to Foreign Affairs, Are Its Powers Inherent as
Distinguished from Delegated?, 32 GEo. L.J. 375 (1944). These commentators are too ready
to relegate parts of the opinion to the status of dicta, and they neglect the true impli-
cations of the "Story-Wilson" position. See pp. 13-24 infra. Recently, Raoul Berger has
offered a more perceptive analysis of the historical evidence, although without, in my
opinion, adequately confronting the dicta issue. See Berger, War-Making by the President,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 69-75 (1972); Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign
Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1, 26-33 (1972). Berger's articles became available after the
present article was largely completed; I am gratified that his studies, while less detailed
specifically on Curtiss-Wright, generally support my own conclusions. For evidence of the
continued legal relevance of the opinion, see, in addition to the statements cited in notes
12-30 infra, L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 19-35 passim (1972).
Henkin states that the opinion "remains authoritative doctrine." Id. at 25-26.
2. 48 Stat. 811 (1934). See note 33 infra for the complete text of the Joint Resolution.
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signed the Joint Resolution and issued an embargo proclamation on
May 28.3
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, two associated companies, and
four corporate officers were indicted in January 1936 for conspiring
to sell aircraft machine guns to Bolivia in violation of the congressional
resolution and presidential proclamation. 4 The defendants demurred
to the indictment, arguing that the Joint Resolution unconstitution-
ally delegated legislative power to the Executive.5 Agreeing, the dis-
trict court ruled for the defendants.6 This decision threatened the neu-
trality legislation which was evolving in response to European events;
therefore the government appealed. Despite prior decisions evincing
hostility to excessive delegations of power 7 the Supreme Court in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation reversed the lower
court decision seven to one." Whatever danger the lower court deci-
sion posed to the neutrality acts was ended, but in the process sev-
eral propositions were enunciated and approved that were and con-
tinue to be extremely controversial and ambiguous. Justice George
Sutherland's opinion for the Court recognized sweeping federal and,
more specifically, presidential power in the area of international af-
fairs; it also seemed to free Congress from the need to formulate pre-
cise standards when it delegated power involving foreign relations.,
As early as 1940-1941, during the first of what Alfred H. Kelly has
called the "two decisive 'breaks' in the continuity of peace-war rela-
tionships between the Executive and the Congress,"'10 Curtiss-Wright
3. 48 Stat. 1744 (1934).
4. Indictment, in Transcript of Record at 3, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
5. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 14 F. Supp. 230, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1936)
[Curtiss-Wright (S.D.N.Y.)]. Defendants also demurred on two grounds not relevant to
this article: (1) Roosevelt's proclamation failed to meet the requirements set forth in the
Joint Resolution, and (2) the defendants had been indicted after the President revoked
his proclamation. The district court decided for the government on both points and the
Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 232, 235-38; 299 U.S. at 330-33.
6. Curtiss-Wright (S.D.N.Y.) at 240 (on rehearing).
7. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
8. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) [Curtiss-Wright].
Justice McReynolds dissented without opinion and Justice Stone took no part in the case.
Id. at 333.
9. See id. at 315-29.
10. Prepared Statement of Professor Alfred H. Kelly, March 9, 1971, Hearings on War
Powers Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
89 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate War Powers Hearings]. Kelly identified the
second break as the 1950-1951 period when President Harry S Truman, acting under his
own authority as Commander in Chief and as chief foreign policymaker, committed troops
to Korea and raised American force levels in Europe. Id. at 89-91. Curtiss- Wright also
received some attention in this period. See, e.g., HoUsE COMM. ON FOR.EIGN AFFAIRS, BACK-
GROUND INFORMATION ON THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES,
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received attention in arguments over the nature and distribution of
federal power in foreign affairs.11 More recently, during the Vietnam
War, debate over constitutional problems in warmaking has led to re-
newed interest in Curtiss-Wright. No agreement on the meaning of
the case has emerged on either of these occasions. Nor has the Supreme
Court come to definite conclusions about its meaning; what emerges
from the cases in which the Court has cited Curtiss-Wright is a variety
of views not unlike the range of statements from nonjudicial commen-
tators. Altogether, on and off the bench, the decision has been al-
leged to provide some degree of support for a number of propositions
which can be grouped as follows:
1. The United States possesses all the powers of a sovereign na-
tion. 12 Federal authority in foreign affairs is not subject to interfer-
ence from the states. 13 Even though the Constitution makes no grant
to Congress, the existence of congressional power to legislate concern-
ing foreign affairs cannot be doubted.' 4 But "congressional power in
this sphere ... is limited by the First Amendment."'u
2. The President possesses inherent power in the foreign affairs
field which Curtiss-Wright "explicitly and authortatively define[s]."'1
H.R. Doc. No. 127, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 11, 51 (1951). For a general discussion of the
Korean War debate, see Lofgren, Mr. Truman's War: A Debate and Its Aftermath, 31
REV. OF POL. 223 (1969).
11. For this and the other conclusions in this paragraph see pp. 4-5 infra.
12. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519-20 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in result); notes 13 & 14 infra.
13. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 331 (1937).
14. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958).
15. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 96 (1961). Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, made this qualification after
citing Curtiss-Wright to support the broad proposition.
16. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 643-44 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(maintaining, however, that Curtiss-Wright required such presidential power to be exer-
cised in compliance with the Constitution); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 728-29 & n.3 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 741-42 (Marshall, J., con-
curring); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 661 n.3 (1952) (Clark, J.,
concurring); Krauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19, 45 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Wright, The Transfer of Destroyers
to Great Britain, 34 Am. J. INf'L L. 680, 680-81 & n.5 (1940); 39 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 484, 486-
87 (1940) (quotation in text accompanying this note is at 486); citations in notes 17-23
infra. Cf. Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Henry Stimson, Jan. 29, 1941, Hear-
ings on a Bill to Promote the Defense of the United States (S. 275) Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 90-91 (1941) (S. 275 was the Senate
version of the Lend-Lease Bill, H.R. 1776); Hearings on Lend-Lease Bill Before the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 334 (1941) (exchange between Norman
Thomas and Representative James A. Shanley, Jan. 22, 1941); Prepared Statement of Sena-
tor Barry Goldwater, April 23, 1971, 1971 Senate War Powers Hearings, supra note 10,
at 355; Acheson, The Eclipse of the State Department, 49 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 593, 593-94
(1971). The extent of agreement on this proposition is well illustrated by the New York
Times case. The three justices who cited Curtiss-Wright-Stewart and Marshall, both of
whom concurred in the Court's decision, and Harlan, who dissented-all agreed that it
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Accordingly, "the President is exclusively responsible" for "the con-
duct of diplomatic and foreign affairs";1 7 he is the "sole organ" of
government with respect to foreign relations;'18 and he may conclude
international agreements not requiring the consent of the Senate. 10
Curtiss-Wright raises a "serious question whether the Congress can
constitutionally limit the President's powers in the field of our rela-
tions with foreign governments." 20 This interpretation also sanctions
executive withholding of information pertaining to foreign affairs and
national security from Congress21 and from the public.2- It similarly
bolsters claims that the government need not reveal information re-
lated to national security, which was obtained without warrant through
electronic surveillance, to defendants whose rights may be directly
affected. 23
3. Legislation concerning foreign relations need not satisfy the
same judicial tests applied in delegation decisions involving domestic
matters.24
supported an independent executive power in foreign affairs. (Marshall thought Curtiss.
Wright was qualified in this regard by Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), but that does
not alter his assessment of the meaning of Curtiss-Wright itself.) See New York Times
Co. v. United States, supra at 728-29, 741-42 & n.2, 756.
17. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).
18. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766-68
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 756 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hirata v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 208 (1949)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 111 (1948); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); Memorandum entitled
"Termination of Hostilities" by the Legal Advisor, Green H. Hackworth, to the Sec'y of
State, Dec. 20, 1941, 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 1942,
at 8, 12 (1960). Cf. To PROMOTE THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REIP. No. 18,
77th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 6-7 (1941); Prepared Statement of Senator Barry Goldwater,
supra note 16, at 355.
19. See United States v, Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942).
20. Memorandum entitled "The President's Powers under H.R. 1776 [the Lend-Lease
Bill] and some Prior Instances of Presidential Power," in House Comm. on Foreign Af-
fairs, File on H.R. 1776, National Archives, Washington, D.C. This memorandum was pre-
pared in the Treasury Department and was probably written in January 1941. 1 am in-
debted to Congressman Jerry L. Pettis of California for assistance in securing a copy of
this document. See W. KIMBALL, THE MOST UNSORDID AcT: LEND LEASE, 1939-1941, at 174-
75 & n.56 (1969).
21. See Prepared Statement of Dean Acheson, July 28, 1971, in Hearings on Executive
Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive Before tile Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 259, 260
(1971); Prepared Statement of William H. Rehnquist, Ass't Att'y Gen., July 29, 1971,
id. at 428, 431, 433-34.
22. See Brief for the United States at 13-15, New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 93 S. Ct. 553 (1973).
23. See Brief for the United States at 16, 31, United States v. District Court for Eastern
Dist. of Michigan, Southern Division, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
24. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298
(1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 462 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); 87 CONG.
REC. 491 (1941) (Representative Bloom); id. at 525 (Representative Richards); id. at App.
280 (radio address by Senator George); R. HULL & J. NovocRoD, LAw AND VIETNAM 173-74
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4. Those portions of Sutherland's opinion which go beyond the
issue of delegation in foreign affairs are dicta.25 The decision does
not legitimate loosely controlled delegation in the domestic area even
though such delegation is associated with the conduct of foreign re-
lations; 26 it does not obviate the need for senatorial approval of agree-
ments with foreign powers; 27 and it does not affect CongTess's power
to declare war.28
5. Curtiss-Wright says nothing about who is to make foreign policy
(as opposed to who is to execute it).29 In fact, Curtiss-Wright does
not hold that looser standards are permissible in connection with dele-
gation involving foreign affairs.30
On several occasions the Court has rejected broad interpretations of
the foreign relations power; it has nevertheless avoided directly at-
tacking Curtiss-Wright.31 If anything, the uses to which the opinion
has been put confirm that "[o]ne fact should not be overlooked-that
the ambiguities of the opinion do not rule it out as available prece-
dent."32 In view of the Court's continued use of the case and the on-
going debate over its meaning, it is important to take a close look at
what Sutherland said and at the evidence he adduced in support of
his position.
(1968); Jones, The President, Congress, and Foreign Relations, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 565, 575
(1941); Note, Congress, The President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1802 (1968); Statement by W. Rehnquist on the President's authority
to order the attack on the Cambodian sanctuaries, before the Society of International Law,
June 16, 1970, reprinted in SENATE COMN. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS.,
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY AS
COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND THE WAR IN INDOCHINA 175, 181 (Comm. Print 1970); note 25
infra.
25. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952) (Jackson,J., concurring); 87 CONG. REC. 1605 (1941) (Senator Wheeler); Prepared Statement by Sec'y
of State William P. Rogers, May 14, 1971, 1971 Senate War Powers Hearings, supra note
10, at 495-96 & n.47; Borchard, The Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange of
Destroyers for Naval Bases, 34 Am. J. INT'L L. 690, 691 (1940).
26. See 87 CONG. REc. 517-19 (1941) (Representative Day).
27. See id. at 1347-48 (Senator Shipstead); id. at 1604-05 (Senator Wheeler).
28. See id. at 1605 (Senator Wheeler); Prepared Statement of Professor Alexander
Bickel, July 26, 1971, 1971 Senate War Powers Hearings at 555. Wheeler had earlier con-
tended that Curtiss-Wright, which he sometimes identified as "Wright Brothers against
the United States," "contains the express language that only Congress can declare war
and wage war." 87 CONG. REC. 1049 (1941). He implicitly corrected himself when he at-
tributed (id. at 1605-06) the doctrine that "the term 'to declare war' necessarily connotes
'the plenary power to wage war'" to Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court in United
States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), in which case, however, Sutherland was not care-full distinguishing between powers of the separate branches.
R. Pollak, et al,, Indochina: The Constitutional Crisis-Part 2, 116 CONG. REc. 16478,
16480 n.13 (May 21, 1970).
30. Prepared Statement of Professor Alexander Bickel, supra note 28, at 555; Bickel,
The Constitution and the War, 54 COMMENTARY, July 1972, at 49, 52.
31. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967)' Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129
(1958); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1957) (Black, J., plurality opinion).
32. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 494 (1946).
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I. Precedent versus Principle
Curtiss-Wright held that the Joint Resolution of May 28, 1934,33
was not an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power to the
President. To understand and assess Justice Sutherland's opinion, it
must be viewed historically. At the outset one must remember that
the Court had recently taken a very narrow view of the permissible
scope of delegatory legislation.
In the Panama3 4 and Schechter3 cases, the Court required that dele-
gatory legislation specify the policy it was designed to effectuate, estab-
lish a standard to monitor subsequent executive action, and state those
findings of fact the President was required to make before acting."
On brief in Curtiss-Wright the government maintained that the Joint
Resolution met these tests.37 Considering the result in the lower court
and the government's and defendants' arguments on appeal, the key
issue was whether the Joint Resolution required a finding of fact. 8
On this point, the government contended:
The fact to be found by the President-whether prohibition of
the sale of arms in this country may contribute to the reestablish-
ment of peace in the Chaco-is not, as the defendants have con-
tended, a vague matter of opinion merely, upon which only a
guess might be made. On the contrary, it is an eminently prac-
tical question depending upon facts which were peculiarly avail-
able to the President .... The state of the war, which might vary
widely and rapidly, the number and type of purchases in this
country by each side, and the sales if no prohibition were im-
posed, which would depend upon the financial condition of the
33. Resolved . . .. That if the President finds that the prohibition of the sale of
arms and munitions of war in the United States to those countries now engaged in
armed conflict in the Chaco may contribute to the reestablishment of peace between
those countries, and if after consultation with the governments of other American
Republics and with their cooperation, as well as that of such other governments as
he may deem necessary, he makes proclamation to that effect, it shall be unlawful
to sell, except under such limitations and exceptions as the President prescribes, any
arms or munitions of war in any place in the United States to the countries now en-
gaged in that armed conflict, or to any person, company, or association acting in
the interest of either country, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress.
Sec. 2. Whoever sells any arms or munitions of war in violation of section 1 shall,
on conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding $10,000 or by imprisonment not
exceeding two years, or both.
48 Stat. 811 (1934).
34. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) [Panama].
35. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) [Schechter].
36. See Panama at 414-30; Schechter at 530-42.
37. Brief for the United States at 10, 16-17, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
38. See Curtiss-Wright (S.D.N.Y.) at 232-36, 239; Brief for the United States at 10-17,
Brief for Appellees John S. Allard, Clarence W. Webster and Samuel J. Abelow at 10-21,
Brief for Appellees Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. and Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Co., Inc.
at 16-26, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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belligerents, transportation facilities, and the like, were all factors
which of necessity entered into his decision. Perhaps even more
important was the fact of cooperation [with other countries] .... 39
These verbal gymnastics do not seem particularly persuasive in view
of the Panama-Schechter tests. In Schechter the Court contended that
in promulgating a Code under the National Industrial Recovery Act,
one of "the finding[s] that the President is to make [is] that the code
'will tend to effectuate the policy of this title.' While this is called a
finding, it is really but a statement of an opinion as to the general
effect upon the promotion of trade or industry of a scheme of laws." '40
In consequence the NRA failed to meet one of the tests of valid dele-
gation. The requirement in the Joint Resolution that the President
find an embargo "may contribute" to the reestablishment of peace was
no more precise. In addition, no hard and fast assessment could be
made of those factors which the government claimed41 would deter-
mine the effect of the embargo. A judgment based on them would
have amounted to the forbidden statement of opinion.42 Notwith-
standing the view of a recent author, the Joint Resolution required
the President to find more than "a necessary factual condition prece-
dent."43 And even if the Joint Resolution could be interpreted to re-
quire a finding, it failed to obligate the President to act once he had
made the requisite finding. Contrary to the apparent requirement of
Panama and Schechter4 4 he retained absolute discretion to issue or not
to issue a proclamation prohibiting arms shipments. 45
So Sutherland and the Court might have accepted the government's
argument that the Joint Resolution met the Panama-Schechter tests,
39. Brief for the United States at 11, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936) (citations omitted).
40. Schechter at 538 (emphasis added).
41. See p. 6 supra.
42. A variety of international uncertainties attended the Chaco arms embargo, which
was eventually implemented to greater or lesser degree by about thirty nations. See W.
GARNER, THE CHACO DISPUTE: A STUDY OF PRESTIGE DIPLOMACY 92-98 passim (1966); Hud-
son, The Chaco Arms Embargo, INT'L CONCILIATION, No. 320, at 217 (1936).
43. Bickel, The Constitution and War, 54 COMMENTARY, July 1972, at 49, 52. I also
think Professor Bickel is incorrect in stating: "The joint resolution closely defined what
the President was to do, namely stay out of war. ... Id. The Resolution said nothing
about keeping the United States out of the Chaco War. Rather, the Resolution authorized
the President-if he concluded it might serve the purpose of peace in the Gran Chaco-
to keep American armaments out of a war which hardly threatened to engulf the United
States. Nor does Professor Bickel's overall discussion of Curtiss-lVright support this par-
ticular statement of his. See id.
44. Cf. Panama at 430; Schechter at 541.
45. See text of the Joint Resolution: "if . . . [the President] makes proclamation
..1' 48 Stat. 811 (1936). See generally Brief for Appellees Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
and Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Co., Inc. at 16-26, United States v. Curtiss-Vright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
The Yale Law Journal
but an opinion bottomed on that contention would have been shaky.
Certainly a more solid foundation was available: The resolution did
not have to meet the Panama-Schechter tests, for it fell into a category
of legislation which was not governed by the tests. This category, using
Sutherland's own language, consisted of legislation whose "whole aim
.. is to affect a situation entirely external to the United States, and
falling within the category of foreign affairs."40
To establish and sanction such a category Sutherland might have
followed the lead of the government on brief47 and cited long-standing
legislative and judicial precedent, but he rejected this simple course.
Taking a more involved route, he began with the proposition that the
discretion vested in the President was consistent with early American
constitutional principles. It was in this context that Sutherland made
his remarks about the inherent federal foreign relations power and
the Executive's independent role in foreign affairs.-s Only then did
he review the series of "acts or joint resolutions of Congress authoriz-
ing action by the President in respect of subjects affecting foreign re-
lations, which either leave the exercise of the power to his unrestricted
judgment or provide a standard far more general than that which has
always been considered requisite with regard to domestic affairs. ' 4
These acts,50 he said, comprised "an impressive array of legislation
.... enacted by nearly every Congress from the beginning of our na-
tional existence to the present day, [which] must be given unusual
weight in the process of reaching a correct determination of the
problem."' 1 The relevant rule had been set forth in several cases. 02
As stated in Field v. Clark, "the practical construction of the Consti-
tution, as given by so many acts of Congress, and embracing almost
the entire period of our national existence, should not be overruled,
unless upon a conviction that such legislation was clearly incompatible
with the supreme law of the land." 53
But if legislative precedent was so compelling, why did it not dis-
pose of the matter? Why did Sutherland not omit his sweeping remarks
about the principles which informed the American Constitution in
46. Curtiss-Wright at 315.
47. See Brief for the United States at 7-9, 15, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
48. Curtiss-Wright at 315-22.
49. Id. at 324.
50. See legislation listed in Curtiss-Wright at 324-27 & n.2 and additional legislation
listed in Panama at 421-22 (which was noticed in Curtiss- Wright at 327).
51. Curtiss-Wright at 327.
52. See listing in Curtiss-Wright at 328-29.
53. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 691 (1892).
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the field of foreign affairs? His biographer offers a clue, commenting
that the "deductive method characterized all of Sutherland's efforts.
Always there was a recurrence to first principles.15 4 Such a logical
style would not tolerate an opinion based on a rule derived inductively.
In fact, a careful reading of the section of the opinion on legislative
precedent reveals Sutherland did not think that its existence validated
the Joint Resolution. His words seem chosen to convey a different
meaning: Long-standing practice suggests that there exist independent
constitutional justifications for the practice and these justifications are
found "in the origin and [early] history of the power involved, or in
its nature, or in both combined."' ' 5
The discussion of legislative precedent, therefore, did not so much
establish a narrower ground for upholding the Joint Resolution as it
simply demonstrated the working of underlying principles. The rule
of interpretation which Sutherland quoted from Field v. Clark56 in-
dicated that long-standing legislative practice could be overruled if
there existed "a conviction that such legislation was clearly incom-
patible with the supreme law of the land." Sutherland prefaced his
own statement of the rule57 with a similar comment.5 8 Thus, while
he later admitted that overturning the legislative practice in question
was unlikely,5 0 on balance he strengthened his argument-given his
premises-by showing grounds independent of legislative precedent
for upholding the Joint Resolution.
Sutherland similarly declined to ground his position on judicial
precedent. The government had claimed that Field v. Clark60 and
Hampton and Company v. United States6l "[c]learly . . . controlled"
Curtiss-Wright.62 "The tariff Acts there involved," said the govern-
ment, "like the resolution here, were inseparably related to the exter-
nal relations of the United States."6 3 The government also averred that
54. J. PASCHAL, MR. JUsTIcE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 15 (1951).
55. Curtiss-Wright at 328. See, e.g., "The principles which justify such legislation find
overwhelming support in the unbroken legislative practice which has prevailed almost
from the inception of the national government to the present day," id. at 322; "a legis-
lative practice such as we have here . . . goes a long way in the direction of proving the
presence of an unassailable ground for the constitutionality of the practice, to be found
in the origin and history of the power involved, or in its nature, or in both combined."
Id. at 327-28. Had Sutherland meant that long-standing practice established constitu-
tionality, he could have said this less cumbersomely.
56. See p. 8 supra.
57. See id.
58. See Curtiss-Wright at 327.
59. See id. at 329.
60. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
61. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
62. See Brief for the United States at 6, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
63. Id. at 15.
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the early case of The A urora4 and other more recent cases-including
Panama-established the propriety of executive discretion.0 5 It is not
difficult to infer why Sutherland omitted this argument. Judicial prece-
dent by itself would have had the same inconclusive quality that he
ascribed to legislative precedent. To paraphrase a later comment by
Justice Frankfurter,66 the Constitution and principles inherent in it,
and not what the courts had ruled, remained for Sutherland "the ul-
timate touchstone of constitutionality."
Even if judicial precedent had deserved great weight, it did not nec-
essarily support the government: A majority which included Suther-
land had recently put its own gloss on The Aurora, Field, and Hamp-
ton. In Panama the Court had found that delegatory legislation had
been upheld in these cases not because it fell into a special category
of foreign relations legislation, but because the delegation involved
was limited, being purely conditional in The Aurora and Field and
administrative in Hampton.67 The Court did hint that delegation
possessed greater validity when it conferred on the President "an au-
thority which was cognate to the conduct by him of the foreign rela-
tions of the Government."6 s The hint, however, is almost imper-
ceptible. It was placed in a discussion of early legislative acts which,
as the Court noted, "were not the subject of judicial decision"6" and
were interim or short-term in duration. 70 There were other recent
cases involving delegation in foreign affairs, 71 but the government in
Curtiss-Wright recognized that they dealt only tangentially with the
constitutional issue.72
64. Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
65. See Brief for United States at 15-16, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
66. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
67. See Panama at 423-26, 429-30.
68. Id. at 422.
69. Id.
70. See id. at n.9. For further discussion of the interim and short-term nature of these
early delegatory acts, see L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY 58-61
(1972).
71. See United States v. Chavez, 228 U.S. 525 (1913); United States v. Mesa, 228 U.S.
533 (1913).
72. See Brief for United States at 15, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936). Interestingly, the government overlooked a pregnant dictum of Suth-
erland's in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936). There, in his opinion
for the Court, he had argued that the federal government possessed "no inherent power
in respect of the internal affairs of the states," but he had also observed: "The question
in respect of the inherent power of that government as to the external affairs of the
nation and in the field of international law is a wholly different matter which it is not
necessary now to consider" (emphasis in original). Yet, while anticipating Sutherland's
position in Curtiss-Wright later that year, this section of the Carter opinion was con-
cerned with the issue of dual federalism and not with the delegation issue that the
government argued in Curtiss.Wright. See id. at 289-97. The omission is thus understand-
able. See also note 81 infra.
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Finally, the opinion in Curtiss-Wright cannot be understood apart
from Sutherland's own intellectual background. The ideas expounded
in Curtiss-Wright about the foreign relations power, which the gov-
ernment only fleetingly and vaguely suggested on brief,73 were hardly
new to the Justice in 1936. In 1919 he had presented similar views in
a book entitled Constitutional Power and World Affairs.7 4 This book
reiterated a thesis which he had advanced in an article in 190975 and
which he possibly acquired from one of his teachers at the University
of Michigan Law School.70
Both the book and article contended that the power of the federal
government with respect to foreign relations was and always had been
complete. Such power did not come from delegations by the states or
from affirmative grants in the Constitution but derived from external
sovereignty inherited by the federal government from Great Britain
via the united colonies and the Confederation. In these writings Suther-
land had been interested in refuting the doctrine that dual federalism
(which he otherwise accepted) placed limitations on federal activity in
the external realm. He did not devote much attention to the alloca-
tion of the general foreign relations power among the branches of
the federal government. 7 He did claim, however, that extra-constitu-
tional action in foreign affairs should not be equated with un-con-
stitutional action.7 8 In other words, without directly confronting the
separation of powers issue involved in Curtiss-Wright, Sutherland de-
veloped the ideas he would put into service in strikingly similar lan-
guage in his later opinion.7 9 Thus, one source of Sutherland's com-
73. The suggestion was made in the government's use of the quotation from Panama
quoted at p. 10 supra. Brief for the United States at 8, 15, United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Defendants took notice of this hint in denying
that the "Constitution ... affords any basis for the contention that the power to make
laws which may affect our foreign relations may be vested in the Executive instead of in
the Congress." Brief for Appellees Allard et al. at 10, United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In district court the government had been more ex-
plicit in advancing an argument similar to the one Sutherland used in Curtiss-Wright.
See Curtiss-Wright (S.D.N.Y.) at 239.
74. G. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 25-47, 116-26 (1919)
(hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUT7ONAL POWER]. This book was based on Suther-
land's Blumenthal Lectures at Columbia University in 1918.
75. Sutherland, Internal and External Powers of the National Government, 191 NORTH
Ahr. Rv. 373 (1910) [hereinafter cited as Sutherland, Internal and External Powers].
This also appeared as S. Doc. No. 417, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910).
76. See Paschal, supra note 54, at 226-28. See also id. at 15-20.
77. For the main exceptions to this statement, see SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
70-91 (concerning the locus of the war power) & 122-32 (concerning participation in
the treaty power).
78. See id. at 55; Sutherland, Internal and External Powers, supra note 75, at 384.
79. See Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 469-70, 473-76 (1946) (conveniently collecting pertinent quota-
tions from Curtiss- Wright and Sutherland's book and article). Especially compare SUTHER-
LAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, supra note 74, at 116-17, 125-26, with Curtiss-Wright at
316-17, 320-21.
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ments in Curtiss-Wright is not difficult to discover: it was Sutherland
himself. The case put the Justice in what one writer has called "the
happy position of being able to give [his] writings and speeches the
status of law."s °
The fact that the views Sutherland expressed in Curtiss-Wright were
his own nevertheless does not relegate them to status of dicta. Aside
from a personal commitment to these views, he had good reasons for
his opening discussion of first principles regarding the foreign relations
power. Although it came first in his presentation, the discussion of
principles followed from his comments about legislative precedent, and
was not logically superfluous. It offered a means of establishing what
resort to either legislative or judicial precedent could not conclusively
establish and what respect for consistency and tenable distinctions re-
quired if the Joint Resolution were to be upheld in the face of Panama
and Schechter.
II. First Principles: Justice Sutherland's Argument and Evidence
Justice Sutherland's fundamental premise was that the external and
internal powers of the federal government "are different, both in re-
spect of their origin and their nature." Internally, the government was
one of enumerated powers, with the Constitution designed "to carve
from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states
such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal govern-
ment, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the states."
However, "since the states severally never possessed international pow-
ers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of state
powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States from some
other source." These "international powers" or "powers of external
sovereignty" devolved on the federal government from the Confed-
eration government, which in turn acquired them from "the colonies
in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of
America." The ultimate source was the British Crown, although its
possession of the external sovereignty of the American colonies ceased
prior to America's formal independence because "[e]ven before the Dec-
laration [of Independence], the colonies were a unit in foreign affairs,
acting through a common agency-namely the Continental Congress
... ." "Rulers come and go," wrote Sutherland; "governments end and
80. Levitan, supra note 79, at 476.
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forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A political so-
ciety cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty
is never held in suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty
of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased it immediately passed
to the Union." 81 To borrow a term from his earlier writings,8 2 Suther-
land sought to place the federal government's foreign relations power
on an extra-constitutional footing.
After providing additional detail 3 Sutherland turned to Joseph
Story's Commentaries on the Constitution for "general confirmation
of" his position.8 4 Because Sutherland saw fit to rely upon Story, the
views of Story are of particular concern in understanding Curtiss-
Wright. Story advanced three separate meanings of the term "sov-
ereignty." "By 'sovereignty' in its largest sense," he wrote, "is meant,
supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power, the jus summi imperii, the
absolute right to govern . . . .A State which possesses this absolute
power, without any dependence on any foreign power or state, is in
this largest sense a sovereign state."8 5 At the same time, Story noted,
"the sovereignty of the government, organized within the state, may
be of a very limited nature."8 6 By this "sovereignty of the government,"
or sovereignty in "a far more limited sense," Story meant "such
political powers, as in the actual organization of the particular state
or nation are to be exclusively exercised by certain public function.
aries, without the control of any superior [governmental] authority."87
A third sense of the term, as set forth by Story, is in "speak[ing] of a
state as sovereign ... in reference to foreign states. Whatever may be
the internal organization of the government of any state, if it has the
sole power of governing itself and is not dependent upon any foreign
81. Curtiss- Wright at 315-17. The only immediate citations for these remarks were
Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 80-81 (1795), which is discussed at pp. 20-21
infra, and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936). The latter citation is in-
triguing. In Carter Sutherland had hinted at the view he would expound in Curtiss-Wright
(see note 72 supra), but here he used Carter merely to support his assertion that in-
ternally the federal government was one of enumerated powers. Sutherland's later cita-
tion of Story's Commentaries also covered this material.
82. See SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, supra note 74, at 55; Sutherland, Internal
and External Powers, supra note 75, at 384.
83. See pp. 17-21 infra.
84. Curtiss-Wright at 317 n.l.
85. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 207, at
191-92 (1833) [hereinafter cited as STORY). I have used the first edition of Story, which is
now readily available as a reprint. The text of the sections cited by Sutherland does not
vary between the first edition and the fourth edition, which Sutherland used. Pagination
does vary, so I have also included section numbers to facilitate use of other editions. The
sections of Story relied upon in this and the following three paragraphs are those cited
by Sutherland.
86. Id. § 208, at 194.
87. Id. § 207, at 192 (emphasis added).
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state, it is called a sovereign state; that is, it is a state having the same
rights, privileges, and powers, as other independent states." 8
Sutherland recognized that the united colonies, prior to independ.
ence, exercised sovereignty in its limited sense-that is, they held cer-
tain powers of sovereignty, including some pertaining to external af-
fairs. For Sutherland, though, another government was evidently the
only possible source for these powers of sovereignty. So, since the states
severally had never possessed powers of "external sovereignty," these
powers must have come from Great Britain. In turn, the schemes by
which the states vested only enumerated powers in the federal gov-
ernment-that is, de facto arrangements until 1781, the Articles of
Confederation from 1781 to 1789, and the Constitution after 1789-
had little effect on the allocation and limitation of external powers.
From Story's perspective, however, there is a flaw in Sutherland's
argument. For Story, the true source of the powers of sovereignty,
whether external or internal, was the sovereign in the largest or ab-
solute sense of the term. In the United States "[t]he absolute sov-
ereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation.. ."I'll The people
were "the foundation, upon which the super-structure of the liberties
and independence of the United States has been erected." 0 The only
point at which Story came at all close to Sutherland's view of the trans-
mission of sovereignty was in a passage he quoted from Chisholm v.
Georgia: "From the crown of Great Britain the sovereignty of their
country [that is, the United States] passed to the people of it . . .,,1
Yet this establishes the people as the possessors of absolute sovereignty
and as the source of governmental power.92
Finally, the sovereignty of the United States "in reference to foreign
states"-that is, in Story's third sense-also had its source in an act of
the people. "The people of the united colonies," wrote Story, "made
the united colonies free and independent states, and absolved them
from all allegiance to the British Crown."'9 3 It is difficult to interpret
Story as claiming that the Continental Congress held powers of "ex-
ternal sovereignty" by virtue of the sovereign status of the United
States "in reference to foreign states." Instead, the reverse was true:
The existence of powers of sovereignty, based on the consent of the
88. Id. § 209, at 195 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. § 208, at 195 (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 214, at 203.
91. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793), quoted in I STORY § 216, at
205 (emphasis is Story's and does not appear in the original).
92. See also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470-72 (1793).
93. 1 STORY § 211, at 199.
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absolute sovereign, gave rise to the sovereignty of the United States
"in reference to foreign states." Story specifically linked Congress's
authority in the external realm to the approval of people.94
Although Story's Commentaries fails to support Sutherland's posi-
tion, a complete evaluation of Sutherland's account of sovereignty in
early America requires consideration of the views of Americans in the
1770's and 1780's. In this regard, a recent scholar has written that
James Wilson's defense, in 1785, of the constitutionality of the Bank of
North America "will ... suggest to the student of constitutional his-
tory the inherent powers doctrine of . . . Curtiss-Wright."9 Wilson
claimed that Article II of the Articles of Confederation, which reserved
to the states all powers not expressly delegated to the Confederation
government, pertained only to those powers the states had once held.
Since no state had held power to incorporate a bank commensurate
with the needs of the United States, no state could have retained that
power. Contrary to Sutherland, however, and like Story, Wilson held
that the general powers of the Confederation "result[ed] from the
union of the whole . .." He did not mention England as a possible
source. 90 Moreover, the argument that certain broad powers, not men-
tioned in the Articles, were vested in the Confederation government
independently of state delegation would have no force concerning the
foreign relations power, for the Articles gave explicit attention to
foreign relations. 97 Whatever its immediate impact,98 Wilson's defense
of the bank foreshadowed the popular sovereignty position toward
which he and other key figures in the 1780's were slowly moving: Ab-
94. See id. §§ 213-14, at 200-02.
95. McCloskey, Introduction, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 3 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
96. See Wilson, Considerations on the Bank of North America, in id. at 829-30 (quo-
tation is at 829). See generally id. at 824-40.
97. See ART. OF CONFED. arts. VI & IX.
98. Professor McDonald describes Wilson as "the ablest spokesman for the theory
that sovereignty devolved upon Congress or the whole people," but also claims that dur-
ing the Confederation period few took Wilson's argument seriously. F. MCDoNALD, E
PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1790, at 191 n.t (1965).
Certainly when the bank was chartered in 1781, both Robert Morris, the Confederation's
Superintendent of Finance who proposed it, and Congress had doubts about congressional
authority in the area. Congress accepted Morris's recommendation that the states be re-
quested to pass enabling legislation. See Letter from Morris to the President of Congress,
May 17, 1781, in 4 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 421 (F. Warton ed. 1889); Letter from Morris to the Governors of the States, Jan.
8, 1782, in 5 id. at 94-95; 20 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 545-48 & accompany-
ing notes (1912) (session of May 26, 1781); 21 id. at 1190 (session of Dec. 31, 1781); Letter
from the Virginia Delegates to the Governor of Virginia, Jan. 8, 1782, in 6 LETTERS OF
MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 288-89 (E. Burnett ed. 1921). Cf. Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to Morris, April 30, 1781, in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
604, 630 (H. Syrett and J. Cooke eds. 1961) (tacit admission of Congress's severely limited
authority). On Wilson's general relations with the Bank of North America, see C. SMITH,
JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798, at 140-58 (1956).
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solute sovereignty could reside with the people, with different govern-
ments within the same nation simultaneously possessing different pow-
ers of sovereignty.99
Prior to the late 1780's few Americans accepted the popular sov-
ereignty position, however implicit it may have been in the events and
documents of independence.' 00 Most of those who paid attention to
political issues would have denied that from the beginning of the Revo-
lution the people of the United States (or of the united colonies) were
the constitutive body with respect to the emerging central government.
They would have agreed that absolute sovereignty is indivisible, and,
like William Blackstone, they would have assigned it to a particular
legislative body and not to the people at large. An implication of this
early position was that absolute sovereignty must rest with either the
central government or the state governments, but could not rest with
both.' 0 '
In 1776 and 1777 Congress debated the proper allocation of sov-
ereignty; 102 the outcome is readily apparent. The second article of the
draft plan of union first considered by Congress provided that each
colony "reserves to itself the sole and exclusive Regulation and Gov-
ernment of its internal police in all matters that shall not interfere with
the Articles of Confederation."' 0' 3 The plan finally approved by Con-
gress and eventually ratified by the states contained a rather different
clause: "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence
and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by the confed-
eration expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assem-
bled."'1 4 This provision of the Articles, unlike the original draft, did
not distinguish between powers of "internal police" and other powers.
It is not surprising that in 1786 the Confederation's Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, John Jay, reported to Congress that the rights to
99. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 344-89,
524-47 (1969).
100. The challenge to then existing notions of legislative sovereignty is evident in,
e.g., the Declaration of Independence.
101. See G. WooD, supra note 99, at 344-83 passinm, which may be usefully supple-
mented by two older studies: A. SMALL, THE BEGINNIN;S OF AMERICAN NATIONALIrY: THl
CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS AND THE COLONIES AND
STATES (8 JOHNS HOPKINS STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (H. Adams
ed. 1890)); Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An Historical Study, 12
AM. HIST. REV. 529 (1907). But cf. Nettels, The Origins of the Union and of the States,
58 MASS. HIST. Soc. PROC. 68 (1957-60).
102. See M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
SOCIAL-CONSTIrUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781, at 167-76
(1959); G. WOOD, supra note 99, at 354-61. Jensen is not particularly rigorous in dis-
tinguishing the congressional sovereignty and popular sovereignty positions, but neither
were some of the people he discusses.
103. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 547 (1906) (July 12, 1776).
104. ART. OF CONFED. art. II.
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make war, peace, and treaties were a part of the "perfect though lim-
ited sovereignty" which "the thirteen independent sovereign states"
had vested in Congress "by express delegation of power."'10 Congress
subsequently approved resolutions embodying Jay's view.100
As Jay's report exemplifies, contemporary comments on the issue of
sovereignty were often imprecise and sometimes contradictory; formu-
lation of a new concept of sovereignty in America was slow and un-
systematic.'0 7 The crucial point is that both the earlier state sov-
ereignty position and the emerging popular sovereignty position, which
was arguably manifested in the Constitution,'0 " are at odds with Suth-
erland's views.' 00 Each attributes to the central government only
those powers delegated by the possessors of absolute sovereignty; nei-
ther admits of extra-constitutional powers.
Sutherland nevertheless adduced some specific evidence for his po-
sition. He claimed the Treaty of 1783 between Great Britain and the
"United States of America" was a "practical application of [the] fact"
that external sovereignty passed immediately from Britain to the
American Union." 0 However, the Articles of Confederation, which
went into effect in 1781, had expressly granted to Congress the treaty-
making power."'
The Constitution, said Sutherland, "was ordained and established
*.. to form 'a more perfect Union' " in circumstances where the ex-
isting government already "was the sole possessor of external sov-
ereignty." Such sovereignty remained "in the Union . . . without
change except in so far as the Constitution in express terms qualified
105. 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 797-98 (1934) (Oct. 13, 1786) (em-
phasis added). At issue was state compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace
with Great Britain. Interestingly, in The Federalist Papers, Jay spoke of the treaty
power under the Constitution as being delegated without indicating by whom. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 432 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
106. See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 124-25, 177-84 (1936) (March
21, April 13, 1787).
107. See notes 99 g: 101 supra, and A. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 131-36 (1935), which contains an especially perceptive discussion.
108. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 39-40 (J. Madison); 1 STORY §§ 350-60, at 318-19;
G. WooD, supra note 99, at 529-32, 536-47. The nature of the Constitution, of course,
remained unsettled at least until the Civil War. Some still debate it. See, e.g., J.
KILPATRicx, THE SOVEREIGN STATES (1957).
109. Some commentators on Curtiss-Wright seem not to have grasped this, at least
as evidenced by their long defenses of the state sovereignty position. See Levitan,
supra note 32, at 479-89; Patterson, In re The United States v. The Curtiss-Wright
Corporation, 22 TEXAS L. REV. 286, 304-08, 445-63 (1944).
110. Curtiss-Wright at 317. At this point Sutherland himself placed quotation
marks around the United States of America.
111. ART. OF CONFED. art. IX. Even so, "the peace treaty . . . was ratified by some
states separately, and in New Hampshire it was ratified by individual towns." F.
McDoNALD, supra note 98, at 191 n.t. For specific examples of earlier state action and
claims to authority in the area of foreign relations, see Van Tyne, supra note 101,
at 539-41.
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its exercise." 1 12 The implication regarding the source of the new gov-
ernment's external powers is as clear as it is misleading. In fact, the
Constitution, like the Articles, mentions important aspects of the
foreign relations power. 113 Thus it is more accurate to say that the
power is vested in the federal government because it is explicitly and
implicitly granted by the Constitution and that it ultimately derives
not from Britain but from whatever body legally ordained and es-
tablished the Constitution.
Sutherland's contention that the Constitutional Convention "was
called and exerted its powers upon the irrefutable postulate that though
the states were several their people in respect of foreign affairs were
one' .4 is roughly accurate but is irrelevant to his theory. If anything,
the implication that the people of the United States were the source
of the foreign relations power detracts from his position. To be more
accurate Sutherland might have said that the Convention was called
because it was felt that the United States should be one with respect
to foreign affairs (and certain other affairs), but that they could easily
become several, and that they were most definitely having a difficult
time maintaining themselves internationally as a nation."11 This refined
premise, however, also cuts against claiming an extra-constitutional
origin for the foreign relations power; it indicates the Constitution
was needed to establish a more effective federal power respecting
foreign affairs. Indeed, in The Chinese Exclusion Case," 6 cited at
this point by Sutherland as lending some support to his view regard-
ing the inherent, extra-constitutional nature of the foreign relations
power, Justice Field had stated: "The power of exclusion of foreign-
ers [is] an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the
United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution .... "117
112. Curtiss-Wright at 317.
113. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8 & 10; id. art. II, § 2; id. art. VI.
114. Curtiss-Wright at 317.
115. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (M. Farrand
ed. 1911) (May 29, 1787) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND]; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3 & 5
(J. Jay), 13 (A. Hamilton); P. VARG, FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 46-69
(Penguin ed. 1969); Farrand, The Federal Convention and the Defects of the Con-
federation, 2 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 532, 536 (1908); Marks, Foreign Affairs: A Winning
Issue in the Campaign for Ratification of the United States Constitution, 86 POL. ScI.
Q. 444 (1971). For a brighter view of the Confederation's prospects, see M. JENSEN,
THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIlE CONFEDERATION 1781-
1789 (1950).
116. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
117. Id. at 609 (emphasis added). See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 757-58 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
Vol. 83: 1, 1973
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation
It would seem that Sutherland found firmer support for his posi-
tion in a statement he quoted from Rufus King, made during the
Constitutional Convention:
The States were not "sovereigns" in the sense contended for by
some. They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty.
They could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties.
Considering them as political Beings, they were dumb, for they
could not speak to any foreign Sovereign whatever. They were
deaf, for they could not hear any propositions from such Sov-
ereign. They had not even the organs or facilities of defence or
offence, for they could not of themselves raise troops, or equip
vessels, for war.118
An immediate problem with King's statement is a general one that
arises when using the Convention's debates to interpret the Constitu-
tion. As Madison noted several years later, the state ratifying conven-
tions and not the Philadelphia Convention gave the Constitution its
legal "life and validity." 19 Moreover, whatever opinion in Philadel-
phia may have been, it is hardly conclusive in itself in determining
how Americans of 1787-1788 generally interpreted the Constitution.
Nor does it provide any authoritative guide to what Americans thought
about the preceding decade of their history either in 1787-1788 or at
the time. It may, of course, give insight into ideas and assumptions of
the period, 20 which makes further examination of King's statement
worthwhile.
When examined more closely, the King quotation provides scant
support for Sutherland's theory, since like most of Sutherland's evi-
dence it says nothing about whether the Confederation's power re-
specting foreign affairs was inherited, extra-constitutionally, from
England or derived from a constitutional source. 12' Elsewhere in the
same speech, however, King clearly implied the power was delegated
by the states. "If the states [under the Confederation] therefore re-
118. 1 FAMRAND, supra note 115, at 323 (June 19, 1787) (Madison's notes). Suther-
land's version of the quotation, in Curtiss-Wright at 317, is taken from an earlier
printing of Madison's notes, and differs slightly in spelling, capitalization and punc-
tuation.
119. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. col. 776 (1849) (April 6, 1796).
120. See Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
81 YALE L.J. 672, 677-78, 690 n.79 (1972). See also Anderson, The Intention of the
Franers: A Note on Constitutional Interpretation, 49 Arr. POL. Sci. RFv. 340 (1955).
121. "Constitutional" in this context refers, of course, not to the Constitution
drafted in 1787 but to the constitutive base of the Confederation government.
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tained some portion of their sovereignty," he commented, "they had
certainly divested themselves of essential portions of it. ' 12 2
Sutherland did not survey the views of other participants in the
Convention. Some of them did state or imply that the states were
sovereign under the Confederation.' 2 3 Others denied this was the
case, 124 but one of this group-James Madison-later in life claimed
he had been misinterpreted. 25 James Wilson continued to portray the
people of the United States as the source of federal authority under
the Articles. 12 Most members did not discuss the issue of sovereignty.
None adhered to the position advanced nearly 150 years later in Curtiss-
Wright.
The early views of the Supreme Court should be accorded consid-
erable weight in interpreting the Constitution and Sutherland rdcog-
nized this in citing Penhallow v. Doane. 27 However, the opinion he
cited, by Justice Patterson, was but one of four seriatim opinions in
the case, and it does not support Sutherland's argument. Patterson por-
trayed the external power of the Continental CongTess prior to the
ratification of the Articles as deriving not from Great Britain or some
other source external to the ordinary constitutive authority, but from
the people.' 28 Repeating his opinion on Circuit, Justice Blair took a
similar view, although he was ambiguous whether Congress's external
authority derived directly from the people or indirectly from the peo-
ple via the states.' 29 Justices Iredell and Cushing did not doubt that
the Continental Congress's power derived from state delegation.230
122. 1 FARRAND, supra note 115, at 324 (June 19, 1787) (Madison's notes) (emphasis
added); accord, id. at 331 (King's notes). In his own mind King evidently thought the
Confederation derived power from both the states and the people. See R. ERNsr,
RuFus KING: AMERICAN FEDERALIST 100 (1968).
123. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 115, at 19, 250, 340-41.
124. See, e.g., id. at 324-25, 471.
125. See Letter from Madison to W.C. Rives, Oct. 21, 1833, in 3 id. at 521, 522.
126. See 1 id. at 329. See Wilson's remarks in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOI'TION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION ... 432-58 passin (J. Elliot ed. 1888) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT] for
a more extended discussion of his views on sovereignty in late 1787.
127. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 80-81 (1795), cited in Curtiss-Wright at 317. In order of
Sutherland's presentation, this was the first piece of evidence cited. I have postponed
discussion of it to this point in order to preserve a rough chronological framework.
128. "These high acts of sovereignty were submitted to, acquiesced in, and ap-
proved of, by the people of America. In Congress were vested, because by Con-
gress were exercised with the approbation of the people, the rights and powers of
war and peace." 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 80 (emphasis in original).
129. See id. at 109-13. For an argument basing congressional authority after inde-
pendence on grounds similar to those adduced by Patterson, but introducing am-
biguities not unlike those in Blair's opinion, see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,
222-23 (1796) (Chase, J., separate opinion).
130. See 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) at 92-95, 117 (separate opinions of Iredell & Custing, JJ.).
The remaining two members of the Court took no part in the decision; Chief Justice
Jay was in England on the diplomatic mission which resulted in Jay's Treaty, and
Justice Wilson disqualified himself because of an earlier involvement in the case. SMITH,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation
While each Justice satisfied himself that the Continental Congress,
even before ratification of the Articles of Confederation, had held suf-
ficient authority to establish an appellate procedure in Revolutionary
War Prize Cases,131 none of them used arguments supportive of Suther-
land's view.
Sutherland missed one piece of evidence from the original Consti-
tution which could be interpreted to support his case. While ordinary
legislation is the supreme law of the land if "made in Pursuance" of
the Constitution, treaties become supreme law when made under the
"Authority of the United States."'132 In the state ratification debates
several antifederalists attacked this arrangement. 133 The federalists paid
little attention to the problem, concentrating instead on the broader
issue of whether the treaty-making process, as specified in the Con-
stitution, contained adequate safeguards for state and regional inter-
ests. 134 This fact may indicate that most federalists agreed treaties were
extra-constitutional, or it may indicate that they did not regard the
charge as credible enough to warrant refutation. 13 What the majority
of delegates to the state conventions thought is problematic. Whether
the original understanding of the status of treaties would support Suth-
erland is therefore also problematic. 30 By the time Sutherland wrote
supra note 98, at 372. One can guess, though, that Wilson would have written an
opinion similar to Patterson's and that Jay might have done the same or else have
tended toward the more ambiguous position espoused by Blair. Arguments of counsel
in Penhallow, while coming closer to Sutherland's position than did any of the Justices'
opinions, still differed from it in significant respects. See 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 74, 76.
131. Iredell took a different view of certain other aspects of the case and would
have fashioned a slightly different decree.
132. U.S. CONT. art. VI.
133. See, e.g., PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITON OF THE UNITED STATES 1787-1788, at
312, 331 (P. Ford ed. 1888); EsSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1787-1788,
at 361 (P. Ford ed. 1892); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 126, at 215. These statements all sug-
gest, however, that the real concern of the antifederalists was not the supremacy of
treaties over the federal constitution but their supremacy over state constitutions and
law-a considerably different issue. For a more direct statement indicating this con-
cern, see, e.g., 3 id. at 500-14. For general discussions of the treaty problem in the
federal and state conventions, see W. COWLES, TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PROIPERTY INTERFERENCES AND DUE PROCESS OF LAw 1849 (1941); S. CRANDALL, TRATIES:
THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 43-63 (2d ed. 1916).
134. See, e.g., ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 133, at 165; PAMPHLETS ON
1HE CONSTITUTION, supra note 133, at 355, 376; 2 ELLIOT 465-66, 476-77, 505-07; 3 id. at
292-93, 359, 516; 4 id. at 119-21, 280-81; THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (A. Hamilton). See also
C. Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 271 (1934).
135. It should be noted that in a few instances federalists stated or implied that
treaties would be subject to the Constitution in the same way laws were. See 3 ELLIOT
504, 507, 514; 4 id. at 28, 271. It may or may not be significant that both Wilson and
Madison stated during their respective state ratifying conventions that there probably
would be few occasions for concluding treaties. 2 ELLIOT 513; 3 id. at 410.
136. Nevertheless, some indication of an original understanding (in the sense of an
opinion commanding majority support) that treaties were subject to a higher authority
can be gleaned from the Judiciary Act of 1789, which recognized that state courts might
rule against the validity of a treaty. See 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (§ 25) (1789).
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Curtiss-Wright the Court had implied that treaties were subject to
the Constitution, 137 and he himself had taken the same view.1 38
In any event, based on the historical evidence outlined above, Suth-
erland affirmed:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirma-
tive grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage
war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic
relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been men-
tioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal gov-
ernment as necessary concomitants of nationality. 3 9
He noted that the Constitution has no extra-territorial force "unless
in respect of our own citizens," and thus "the operation of the nation
in such territory must be governed by treaties, international under-
standings and compacts, and the principles of international law." More-
over, "[a]s a member of the family of nations, the right and power of
the United States ... are equal to the right and power of other mem-
bers of the international family. Otherwise the United States is not
completely sovereign.' '14 0
Here again Sutherland showed little appreciation for the several
137. See COWLES, supra note 133, at 292-95 passim; B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 133-42 (1963).
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), held that the Tenth Amendment was not a
bar to legislation implementing a valid treaty; it thereby recognized existing au-
thoritative opinion on the subject. See Boyd, The Expanding Treaty Power, 3 SELECTED
EssAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 410, 422-28 (Am. Ass'n L. Schools ed. 1938). In passing,
it should be noted that Professor Schwartz incorrectly concludes, at 135-36, that the
wording "under the Authority of the United States" in the Supremacy Clause was in-
cluded to give validity to preexisting treaties rather than to make treaties superior
to the Constitution. On August 23, 1787, the Federal Convention approved the clause
with wording which (among other things) provided that "all Treaties made under the
authority of the U.S. shall be the supreme law .... " Two days later the clause "was
reconsidered and after the words 'all treaties made' were inserted . . . the words 'or
which shall be made [.]' This insertion was meant to obviate all doubt concerning
the force of treaties preexisting, by making the words 'all treaties made' to refer to
them, as the words inserted would refer to future treaties." 2 FARRAND, supra note 115,
at 389, 417 (Madison's notes). What was therefore crucial to clarifying the meaning
of the clause with respect to the continued validity of preexisting treaties was the
insertion of "or which shall be made" and not the use of "under the Authority of
the United States," which appeared in both the unclear early version and in the
final version. It may well be that Schwartz (who follows Justice Black in Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957), on this point) is correct that the Supremacy Clause was not
intended to give treaties an extra-constitutional status, but the evidence he adduces
does not prove it. Professor Corwin fell into the same trap. See E. CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 421 n.17 (1957).
138. See SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, supra note 74, at 141-65 passimn. In
fact, Sutherland anticipated Holmes's argument in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), but with additional emphasis that such an argument is not tantamount to putting
treaties above the Constitution. See SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 153-58.
139. Curtiss-Wright at 318.
140. Id.
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meanings of "sovereignty" which Joseph Story had discussed.14 1 He
also largely ignored the fact that the Constitution provides either an
explicit or implicit, but still evident, authority for treaties and other
international understandings and compacts. 142 A similar problem
arises in his interpretation of the cases' 43 in which, he claimed, the
Supreme Court had recognized that the United States Government
held specific powers relating to foreign relations by virtue of its
sovereign status under international law. These cases do state that the
American nation possesses the powers incident to any sovereign nation.
They also suggest that those powers reside in the federal government
(or the President) by virtue of constitutional grants. 44
Sutherland concluded his discussion about the nature of federal
power in foreign affairs with a quotation from the then-recent case
of Burnet v. Brooks. "As a nation with all the attributes of sovereign-
ty," Chief Justice Hughes had argued, "the United States is vested
with all the powers of government necessary to maintin an effective
control of international relations.' 4 This case, considered alone, came
closest to supporting Sutherland's thesis about an inherent federal for-
eign relations power. Hughes recognized only such limitations to feder-
al authority in foreign affairs as were imposed by the Constitution. 46
But Burnet included no extended discussion of the point, comparable
to that found in Fong Yue Ting;147 and as authority for the statement
quoted by Sutherland, 148 Hughes relied on Fong Yue Ting 49 and a
concurring opinion in The Legal Tender Cases.150 Justice Gray's opin-
ion for the court in Fong Yue Ting had traced the federal foreign re-
lations power to specific constitutional grants.1 5' Justice Bradley's
141. See pp. 13-14 supra.
142. U.S. CONsr. art. I, §§ 8 & 10; id. art. II, § 2.
143. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1912); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 passim (1893); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212
(1890); all cited in Curtiss.Wright at 318.
144. See Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1912); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 704-12 (1893); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 223
(1890). Among these, Fong Yue Ting contained the most extensive discussion of the
issue; here the Court, per Justice Gray, reviewed in detail the specific constitutional
provisions from which the federal foreign relations power derives. See 149 U.S. at
711-12. Contrary to Sutherland's implication, Altman, strictly speaking, did not involve
the constitutional pxoblem of the extent of the federal government's authority to con-
clude international agreements other than treaties, but rather the problem of inter-
preting the meaning of "treaties" within § 5 of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of
1891, 26 Stat. 826, 828. See 224 U.S. at 600-01.
145. Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933), quoted in Curtiss-Wright at 318.
146. 288 U.S. at 400.
147. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711-15 (1893).
148. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
149. See 288 U.S. at 396.
150. Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 554 (1871) (Bradley,
J., concurring).
151. See 149 U.S. at 711-12.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 83: 1, 1973
concurrence in The Legal Tender Cases had based the federal powers
over war and foreign relations on specific grants and on the fact that
the states were forbidden to enter the field. Bradley spoke of "inher-
ent" powers, but he seems to have been referring to such powers as
were regarded as necessary to a general government when the Consti-
tution was adopted and thus were implicitly vested in the federal
government by the Constitution. 5
2
The federal foreign relations power now tottering on an extra-con-
stitutional footing, Sutherland asserted that "participation in the ex-
ercise of the power is significantly limited."' 5 3 In its exercise the Presi-
dent was the key figure, having important roles in treaty-making and
foreign negotiation generally.154 Sutherland spoke of "the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations-a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress,
but which, of *ourse, like every other governmental power, must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Consti-
tution."' 55 Sutherland supported this view with several pieces of his-
torical evidence.
One item was John Marshall's statement in the House of Repre-
sentatives that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."'5 0"
Since these words of Marshall have often been quoted, it is worthwhile
to put them in context. At issue was whether President John Adams
had acted properly in extraditing a British subject to England on a
murder charge pursuant to the Jay Treaty of 1795. After the statement
just quoted, Marshall continued:
Of consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can only be made
on [the President].
He possesses the whole Executive power. He holds and directs
the force of the nation. Of consequence, any act to be performed
by the force of the nation is to be performed through him.
152. See 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 556. In a similar fashion, the Court in The Legal
Tender Cases traced Congress's authority to make Treasury notes legal tender (1) to
powers enumerated in the Constitution, (2) to powers implied by those enumerated
powers, and (3) to "powers [which] were understood by the people who adopted the
Constitution to have been created by it, (although such] powers [were] not enumerated
and not included incidently in any of those which were enumerated . Id. at 534
(emphasis added).
153. Curtiss-Wright at 319.
154. See id. at 319-21.
155. Id. at 320.
156. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. col. 613 (1851) (March 6, 1800), quoted in Curtiss-Wright
at 319.
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He is charged to execute the laws. A treaty is declared to be law.
He must then execute a treaty, where he, and he alone, possesses
the means of executing it.
The treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a par-
ticular object. The person who is to perform this object is marked
out by the Constitution, since the person is named who conducts
the foreign intercourse, and is to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed. The means by which it is to be performed, the
force of the nation, are in the hands of this person. Ought not this
person to perform the object, although the particular mode of
using the means has not been described? Congress, unquestion-
ably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve on others
the whole execution of the contract; but, till this be done, it seems
the duty of the Executive department to execute the contract by
any means it possesses. 1 57
Marshall, in other words, was claiming that the President's power could
range from ministerial to discretionary, depending on what Congress
had or had not done. It it difficult to extract from Marshall's com-
ments an endorsement of unlimited executive discretion in foreign
policy-making.
Another purported piece of evidence was an 1816 report of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on instructing the President con-
cerning a commercial treaty with Great Britain.""8 Stressing that the
President was "the constitutional representative with regard to foreign
nations," the Committee held that Senate interference threatened the
design, secrecy and dispatch necessary for successful negotiations and
hence would impair national security. 0  Taken as a whole, however,
the Report included a mixture of grounds for not instructing the
President. For one thing, the President already knew the Senate's sen-
timents on the subject. 00 For another, the proposed Senate resolutions
only duplicated past diplomatic instructions. 61 Further, the Report
justified the Senate's noninvolvement in the negotiation process by
noting "that if any benefits be derived from the division of the legis-
lature into two bodies, the more separate and distinct in practice the
negotiating and treaty ratifying [sic] powers are kept, the more safe
the national interests."'0 2 The Committee thereby praised the require-
157. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. cols. 613-14 (emphasis added).
158. See Curtiss-Wright at 319.
159. Foreign Relations Comm. Report of Feb. 15, 1816, in 8 Co pIt.ATioN OF REPORTS
OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE 1789-1901, S. Doc. No.
231, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1901).
160. See id.
161. See id. at 23.
162. Id. at 24-25.
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ment of independent Senate approval. Surely this indicated a conclu-
sion that if the President had any independent authority, it extended
only to the process of negotiation. Even the portion of the Report
quoted by Sutherland affirmed that the President, in his conduct of
foreign relations, "is responsible to the Constitution."' 0 3 The Com-
mittee implicitly asserted that, pursuant to the Constitution, the Senate
could instruct the President: instruction was simply unwise on pru-
dential grounds.' 64 (On other occasions, in fact, the Senate did advise
on treaties, independently of consenting to them.) 10
In 1796 the House of Representatives requested that it be given
documents relating to the Jay Treaty before it appropriated funds for
implementing the Treaty. Sutherland approvingly quoted', 0 President
Washington's denial of the request, a denial which echoed the claim
in Federalist No. 64 that sharing information with the House might
compromise the secrecy requisite to successful negotiations. 167 But
again, this "evidence" on balance detracts from the Justice's position.
Washington's reply turns out as a claim not for independent presi-
dential authority, but for the independence of the treaty-making power
-that is, the President and the Senate. Washington not only did not
view his foreign relations power as resting on an extra-constitutional
base, but he specifically linked it to the Constitution and the inten-
tions of its framers and adopters. 168 When Sutherland commented that
"the wisdom of [Washington's refusal to provide information to the
House] was recognized by the House itself and has never since been
doubted,"' 69 he was wrong. The House debate which followed Wash-
ington's response showed the President had not convinced some mem-
bers. Resolutions reaffirming the House's position passed by a 57-to-35
margin.170 A half century later Representative John Quincy Adams
163. Id. at 24.
164. See id. at 23-25.
165. See CRANDALL, supra note 133, at 72-74; Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS 248 (1922) (containing several instances not mentioned by Crandall).
Sutherland had previously recognized a senatorial role in initiating treaties. See
SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL PowER, supra note 74, at 123.
166. See Curtiss-Wright at 320-21.
167. See Message to the House of Representatives, March 30, 1796, 1 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 186-87 (J. Richardson comp. 1897); THE FEDERALIST No. 63
(J. Jay).
168. See 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESmIENTS, supra note 167, at 187-88.
Washington's view that the state ratifying conventions agreed that the House would
have no independent judgment regarding treaties is questionable, although no definitive
assessment of the original understanding on this point is possible. Wilson and Madison
in their state conventions pictured the House as having an "influence" on treaty-making.
See 2 ELLIOT, supra note 126, at 507; 3 id. at 347. But cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at,
506-07 (A. Hamilton). Other federalists suggested that making commercial treaties would
require the participation of the House. See 3 ELLIOT 365; 4 id. at 48, 267.
169. Curtiss-Wright at 320.
170. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. cols. 762-83 (1849) (March 31-April 7, 1796).
Vol. 83: 1, 1973
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation
conceded that the memory of Washington was "reverenced next to
worship" but still argued that "the President was wrong in that par-
ticular instance [in 1796] and went too far to deny the power of the
House . . . . " During the century following the 1796 episode, on
several occasions the House or individual committees or representa-
tives asserted that body's prerogatives with respect to treaties and for-
eign affairs.1 2
The congressional practice of requesting the State Department to
furnish information "if not incompatible with the public interest,"
while directing other Departments to do so, claimed Sutherland, evi-
denced recognition of "[t]he marked difference between foreign affairs
and domestic affairs .... 1,7 3 The uncertainties attending foreign situa-
tions, plus the need sometimes to condition congressionally-authorized
presidential action in foreign affairs on confidential information, fur-
ther indicated "the unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of
governmental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which
the President is to be governed."' 74 These remarks, however, took Suth-
erland from an exposition of the original theory of the Constitution
-that is, from first principles, which might admittedly be disclosed by
early practice-to general practice and considerations of prudence. Yet,
if general practice controlled the issue, his entire exposition of first
principles was unnecessary. If prudence argued for imposing looser
standards on foreign affairs delegation, then the issue was delegation
and not independent presidential authority. Sutherland's overall point
seems precisely to have been that it was the extra-constitutional nature
of federal power in foreign affairs which allowed prudential considera-
tions to override normal limitations on such power. The ultimate ques-
tion must be whether the Justice had already succeeded in demonstrat-
ing the extra-constitutional nature of federal power in foreign affairs.
Undaunted, Sutherland closed his exposition of constitutional his-
torical premises by quoting from Mackenzie v. Hare: "As a govern-
ment, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereign-
ty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality,
especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other
countries. We should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing
such powers."' 75 In Mackenzie, though, the issue of which brafich
171. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 167 (Jan. 13, 1848).
172. See 2 A. HIND, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 355, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 979-88, 1006-27 (1907).
173. Curtiss.Wright at 321.
174. Id. at 321-22.
175. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915), quoted in Curtiss-Wright at 322
(emphasis added by Sutherland).
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might exercise certain powers was missing as was the delegation issue.
In addition, the quoted section of Mackenzie rested on simple assertion
and tended, as did Sutherland himself,170 to confuse the powers of
sovereignty possessed by a government, sovereignty in what Justice
Story had called its absolute sense, and sovereignty as a relationship
between nations. More important, the section was dicta. Immediately
after the words quoted by Sutherland, Justice McKenna had con-
tinued: "But [such] monition is not necessary in the present case.
There need be no dissent from the cases cited by the plaintiff [who
had been stripped of her citizenship after she married a foreigner];
there need be no assertion of very extensive power over the right- of
citizenship or of the imperative imposition of conditions upon it.' 77
Mrs. Mackenzie had argued that only voluntary expatriation can divest
one of citizenship. McKenna found that her voluntary act of marrying
a foreigner in full knowledge of existing law constituted voluntary
expatriation. 178 Mackenzie thus gave minimal support to Sutherland's
position.
III. The Verdict on Curtiss-Wright
Attempting to assess Curtiss-Wright's impact is hazardous. A recent
writer holds that the tradition of "foreign policy . . . [being] set aside
as a Presidential preserve . . . owes much to the Curtiss-Wright deci-
sion . ... ,179 In discussing Franklin D. Roosevelt's actions prior to
American entry into World War II, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. contends
that while avoiding "grandiose claims of executive authority," F.D.R.
was "doubtless encouraged by Justice Sutherland and the Curtiss-
Wright decision ... ,,180 Nevertheless, it is not clear that the decision
greatly changed the nation's direction. The apparent demise of the
Panama-Schechter doctrine as regards domestic legislation' 8 ' indicates
there is little reason to conclude that an adverse decision would neces-
176. See pp. 13-14, 22-23 supra.
177. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
178. See id. at 310-12.
179. L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY 207 (1972).
180. Schlesinger, Congress and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 51 FoREIGN
AFFAIRS 78, 92 (1972). "That there was not a more vigorous and sustained challenge
to the constitutionality of the lend-lease measure during the course of its enactment [in
1941] can be explained only by reference to the scope of the delegation of power in
the field of foreign relations sanctioned by [Curtiss-Wright]." Jones, supra note 24,
at 574.
181. See Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1938-1962, at 89, 116-19 (Comm. of Ass'n of Amer. Law Schools ed.
1963); L. FISHER, supra note 179, at 71-74. In large part because of Professor Jaffe's com-
ments, I have used the wording "apparent demise."
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sarily or likely have had a lasting impact on the permissible limits of
delegation in foreign affairs. It probably would not even have affected
the neutrality legislation of the latter 1930's. -82 More generally, ex-
tensive presidential power can be upheld without reference to Curtiss-
Wright.1' 3 And the existence of Curtiss-Wright has not kept Congress
from contributing to the formulation of foreign policy-a fact which
Senator J. William Fulbright recognized as early as 1961.184
There remains another sort of historical judgment to render on
Curtiss-Wright. The decision has had, and may continue to have, im-
portance within particular legal and political controversies. By being
available as authoritative precedent, it decreases the need to confront
directly certain basic constitutional issues. As described at the begin-
ning of the article, 185 the decision has in fact been used to support
several propositions pertaining to the Constitution and foreign affairs.
Whether it actually supports these propositions can now be assessed.18 6
That the United States possesses all the powers of a sovereign nation
is undoubtedly correct. That the federal government thereby inher-
ently holds these powers or holds them at all does not automatically
follow. Far from supporting the contention that external sovereignty
devolved on the federal government ultimately from Great Britain and
hence has an extra-constitutional base, Sutherland's historical evidence
and judicial precedents suggest the opposite: Federal power in foreign
182. The main "fact" which the neutrality acts required the President to find was
the existence of a state of war among foreign nations. This is arguably more specific
than the "fact" that an American embargo might contribute to reestablishment of peace.
Moreover, once the President found that war existed abroad, these Acts (except for the
1935 Act) gave him little discretion concerning the actions he was required to take. See
Act of November 4, 1939, 54 Stat. 4 (1939); Act of May 1, 1937, 50 Stat. 121 (1937); Act
of February 29, 1936, 49 Stat. 1152 (1936); Act of August 31, 1935, 49 Stat. 1081 (1935).
In practice, of course, President Roosevelt retained a measure of discretion-for ex-
ample, by simply failing to "find" that China and Japan were at war. See R. DIVINE,
THE ILLUSION OF NEUTRALITY 200-19 (1962).
183. See, e.g., Prepared Statement and Testimony of Professor John Norton Moore,
April 25, 1972, in Hearings on Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements Before
the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 140, 149-60, 173-74 (1972); Prepared Statements of John R. Stevenson, Legal
Advisor, Dep't of State, and William H. Rehnquist, Ass't Att'y Gen., July 1, 1970, in
Hearings on Congress, The President, and The War Powers Before the Subcomm. on
National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 205-16 (1970). But arguments which run counter to Curtiss-Wright
may more generally call into question other sweeping assertions of executive prerogative
in foreign affairs.
184. See Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century under an 18th
Century Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3-6 (1961). In 1961 Senator Fulbright, on
balance, still lamented the congressional input. For a discussion of Congress's impact
on foreign policymaking in recent )ears, see FISHER, supra note 179, at 212-35; F.
WILCOX, CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE AND FOREIGN POLICY (1971).
185. See pp. 3-5 supra.
186. The following assessments rest on the detailed analysis of Curtiss-Wright al-
ready presented, so except where additional evidence is introduced I have not deemed
it necessary to include further documentation.
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affairs rests on explicit and implicit constitutional grants and derives
from the ordinary constitutive authority. Whether Americans in 1787-
1788 and earlier regarded this authority as resting with the states or
with the people of the United States is not entirely clear, for there was
no universally accepted view of the matter. Neither alternative pro-
vides an extra-constitutional base for the foreign relations power. One
need not rely on Curtiss-Wright to limit state participation in foreign
affairs: the Constitution imposes severe limitations. 18 7 Congressional
authority finds similar explicit and implicit bases in the Constitution.
Sutherland himself admitted that federal power in foreign relations
was limited by specific prohibitions in the Constitution.
Sutherland uncovered no constitutional ground for upholding a
broad, inherent, and independent presidential power in foreign rela-
tions. So, since an extra-constitutional base for the general foreign af-
fairs power is also missing, no basis exists for concluding that the Con-
stitution's allocation of foreign relations power between the branches
may be constitutionally ignored. This is not to say that a clear alloca-
tion emerges from the Constitution or that any concrete understanding
respecting allocation in the field of foreign affairs existed in 1787-1788.
However, from both Sutherland's evidence and from other sources,
hints of an implicit understanding do emerge. Americans of that day
probably accorded Congress a coordinate, if not a dominant, role in
the initiation of war, whether declared or not. 88 Control of commer-
cial policy was largely assigned to Congress, 8 9 and contemporaries
thought that commercial relations would constitute a major portion
of America's overall relations with the world.' 90 Treaty-making in-
volved both the President and the Senate; some Americans in 1787-
1788 may have thought that the House would also have an input into
treaty-making. John Marshall, at least in 1800, evidently did not be-
lieve that because the President was the sole organ of communication
and negotiation with other nations, he became the sole foreign policy-
maker. Marshall indicated that Congress could modify the President's
187. Cf. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 173 (1957).
In the same discussion, however, Corwin mistakenly equates Sutherland's theory in
Curtiss-Wright with Justice Patterson's in Penhallow v. Doane. See p. 20 supra.
188. See Lofgren, supra note 120. But cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471 (A. Hamilton):
"Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.
It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks ....... How-
ever, besides making a claim which is quite narrow on its face, Hamilton in context
is not defending the President against Congress. His purpose, instead, is to defend the
executive office as established by the Constitution against antifederalist arguments for
a plural Executive. See id. passim.
189. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
190. See, e.g., F. GILBERT, THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: TO THE
FAREWELL ADDRESS passin (1965); VARG, supra note 115, at 1-69.
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diplomatic role. Sutherland made no direct claim in Curtiss-Wright
that the President possessed authority to conclude international agree-
ments other than treaties. He simply stated that authority existed for
the United States as a nation to do so-a contention that his evidence
neither proved nor disproved.191 Sutherland said little that bears on
the question of executive privilege vis-h-vis Congress. Certainly the
evidence he reviewed gives no support to claims that the Executive
has an inherent power to maintain the confidentiality of information
in its possession.
Sutherland adduced no evidence, other than practice, that restric-
tions imposed by the Constitution on delegation of legislative power
do not apply equally to delegation involving both domestic and foreign
affairs. His evidence, other than practice, 102 leads to precisely the op-
posite conclusion.
In view of the doctrinal climate of the mid-1930's respecting delega-
tion and Sutherland's comments on the need to go beyond practice to
constitutional principles, there is no basis for regarding as dictum
Curtiss-Wright's contention that federal power involving foreign af-
fairs rests on a different base than federal power in domestic affairs.
Similarly, its contention about independent presidential power is not
dictum. If practice does not conclusively establish the Constitution's
meaning, advancing either or both of these contentions was not super-
fluous to upholding the validity of the Chaco arms embargo. Quite
the contrary: These contentions are necessary elements in Sutherland's
opinion.' 93 On its face, moreover, Curtiss-Wright arguably loosens re-
strictions on domestic delegation when such delegation is necessary to
the conduct of foreign relations. 194 It contains grounds which obviate
the need for senatorial approval of certain international agreements.
It does not narrow Congress's power to declare war, for Sutherland
recognized that specific constitutional provisions placed restrictions on
191. For sounder arguments, see W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS(1941); McDougal & Lans. Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agree-
nents: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, in M. McDOUCAL, H. LASSWELL,
V. BURKE, F. FELICIANO, L. LInSON, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 404 (1960).
192. For a brief discussion of the support found in actual practice for Sutherland's
view of presidential power, see Prepared Statement of Professor Alfred H. Kelly, April
25, 1972, in Hearings on Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements, supra note
183, at 176, 178.
193. These contentions would not be dicta even if practice alone did establish Suther-
land's conclusion. "[W]here a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be
relegated to the category of obiter dictum." Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535,
537 (1949) (citations omitted). See generally Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REv.
509 (1952).
194. The resolution and presidential actions upheld in Curtiss-Wright placed re-
strictions on domestic activities, that is, on arms sales in the United States to foreign
countries, in an effort to influence a foreign situation.
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the exercise of external powers, but otherwise it implicitly supports
executive authority to use the armed forces in implementing foreign
policy objectives.
If one not only accepts Sutherland's premise about the need to resort
to first principles rather than practice in constitutional interpretation,
but also tests the historical accuracy of Sutherland's evidence, Curliss-
Wright does not support the existence of an extra-constitutional base
for federal authority, broad independent executive authority, or lax-
ness in standards governing delegation. It certainly invests the Presi-
dent with no sweeping and independent policy role. If, conversely, one
casts aside the notion that first principles are controlling, then Curtiss-
Wright's comments about actual practice provide support for the prop-
osition that delegation in foreign affairs need not be so strictly con-
trolled as Sutherland himself probably thought domestic delegation
should be. This, though, is not to say that the past practice reviewed
in Curtiss-Wright or the legislation therein at issue involved delegation
broader than the domestic delegation which has been upheld since
1936.
In sum, it is incorrect to dismiss major segments of Curtiss-WTright
as dicta. But the history on which those segments rest is "shockingly
inaccurate." 195 If good history is a requisite to good constitutional law,
then Curtiss-Wright ought to be relegated to history.
195. I borrow this phrase from Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge
of American Constitutional History, 69 AM. Hisr. REv. 64, 76 (1963).
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